Hogyan vásároljunk
Kézbesítés
Vásárlási tanácsadó
Rings in Auctions
Angol
168 b
30 nap a termék visszaküldésére
Ezt is ajánljuk
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Puha kötésű
26 137
Ft
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Puha kötésű
29 387
Ft
This book deals with experimental studies in economics. It investigates experimentally collusions in first-price auctions with private values. Since the main aim of the study is to see which mechanisms are used when the subjects may collude, the participants are allowed to communicate as long as they want, before they made their bids, but after they have known their private valuations. Moreover, the winner is allowed to make side payments to losing bidders. The subjects have to invent the mechanism they want to use by themselves. The theoretical possibilities are not explained to them. Four mechanisms have been observed. For each of them, we provide a game theoretical analysis and we compare the data with the theoretical prediction.
Információ a könyvről
Angol
