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Account of Epistemic Goodness
Angol
189 b
30 nap a termék visszaküldésére
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What is the property that makes knowledge, when added to a true belief? Traditionally, epistemic justification has been a popular answer. Here instead, epistemic goodness is suggested in order to isolate the substantial pre-theoretic property required for knowledge without identifying it as epistemic justification. It is noted that a belief has two aspects to be assessed, namely the aspect of acquisition and of maintenance. Utilizing this distinction and criteria such as truth-conduciveness and subjective correctness, this work argues that an epistemically good belief is one that is reliably produced and is correct from the agent s perspective. On the way to this conclusion, Plantinga s theory of warrant called proper functionalism, and Sosa s theory of intellectual virtue are critically investigated and rejected, although many of the merits found in their theories are accommodated. This is a work that those studying epistemology in analytic tradition, especially those who are interested in contemporary debates between internalist and externalist, might want to look up.
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Angol
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