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Rational Choice Using Imprecise Probabilities and Utilities

Name: Rational Choice Using Imprecise Probabilities and Utilities
Brand: Cambridge University Press
SKU: 39904201
Price: 9058 HUF
Availability: InStock
Author: Paul Weirich
ISBN: 9781108604789

Paul Weirich

Language

English

E-book Adobe ePub DRM

Libristo code: 39904201

Publishers Cambridge University Press, February 2021

An agent often does not have precise probabilities or utilities to guide resolution of a decision pr... Full description

Libristo code: 39904201

61 b

9 058 Ft

In stock Immediate digital delivery

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An agent often does not have precise probabilities or utilities to guide resolution of a decision problem. I advance a principle of rationality for making decisions in such cases. To begin, I represent the doxastic and conative state of an agent with a set of pairs of a probability assignment and a utility assignment. Then I support a decision principle that allows any act that maximizes expected utility according to some pair of assignments in the set. Assuming that computation of an option's expected utility uses comprehensive possible outcomes that include the option's risk, no consideration supports a stricter requirement.