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Understanding General Deterrence

Name: Understanding General Deterrence
Brand: PALGRAVE MACMILLAN
SKU: 04551799
Price: 47471 HUF
Availability: InStock
Author: Stephen L. Quackenbush
ISBN: 9780230115040

Theory and Application

Stephen L. Quackenbush

Language

English

Book Hardback

Libristo code: 04551799

Publishers PALGRAVE MACMILLAN, October 2011

This book bridges the divide between formal and quantitative studies of deterrence by empirically te... Full description

Libristo code: 04551799

324 b

47 471 Ft

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This book bridges the divide between formal and quantitative studies of deterrence by empirically testing and extending perfect deterrence theory. The author focuses on general deterrence, which relates to managing relations between states at all times, not only during crises. This distinction is important because understanding general deterrence is more important than understanding immediate deterrence, and because empirical analyses of immediate deterrence can be misleading due to selection effects. In a series of formal and quantitative analyses, the author tests perfect deterrence theory, applies the theory to explain recurrent conflict, and develops a new three-party game of extended deterrence.