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Social Choice and Individual Values

Name: Social Choice and Individual Values
Brand: Martino Fine Books
SKU: 08800767
Price: 2037 HUF
Availability: InStock
Author: Professor Kenneth Joseph Arrow
ISBN: 9781614273455

Professor Kenneth Joseph Arrow

Language

English

Book Paperback

Libristo code: 08800767

Publishers Martino Fine Books, September 2012

2012 Reprint of 1951 Edition. Exact facsimile of the original edition, not reproduced with Optical... Full description

Libristo code: 08800767

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2012 Reprint of 1951 Edition. Exact facsimile of the original edition, not reproduced with Optical Recognition Software. Kenneth Arrow's monograph "Social Choice and Individual Values" and a theorem within it created modern social choice theory, a rigorous melding of social ethics and voting theory with an economic flavor. The work culminated in what Arrow called the "General Possibility Theorem," better known thereafter as Arrow's (impossibility) theorem. The theorem states that, absent restrictions on either individual preferences or neutrality of the constitution to feasible alternatives, there exists no social choice rule that satisfies a set of plausible requirements. The result generalizes the voting paradox, which shows that majority voting may fail to yield a stable outcome.