Free shipping on orders over 19,990 Ft via Packeta, Fox Post Box, and DPD Collection Point

Check order status

Become part of a community of book lovers from all over the world and get access to a whole bunch of benefits. Create an account for free

Free delivery for purchases over 19 990 Ft

DPD courier 1 190 Ft Post 1 795 Ft Post 1 690 Ft Post 1 690 Ft FoxPost 1 190 Ft Packeta point 1 190 Ft DPD point 990 Ft GLS courier 1 690 Ft GLS point 1 190 Ft

Contact

How to shop

Help

My account

▸ Empty :-(

Free shipping on orders over 19,990 Ft via Packeta, Fox Post Box, and DPD Collection Point

Perfect Deterrence

Name: Perfect Deterrence
Brand: Cambridge University Press
SKU: 02043241
Price: 24357 HUF
Availability: InStock
Author: Zagare
ISBN: 9780521787130

Zagare

Frank C. (State University of New York

Buffalo)

Kilgour

D. Marc (Wilfrid Laurier University

Ontario)

Language

English

Book Paperback

Libristo code: 02043241

Publishers Cambridge University Press, September 2000

An important and timely contribution to International Relations and political science, this is the f... Full description

Libristo code: 02043241

166 b

24 357 Ft

In stock at our supplier Shipping in 9-15 days

30-day return policy

Customers also purchased

Erfindung des allgemeinen Wissens Ulrich J. Schneider

Hardback

34 807 Ft

Customer Relationship Management in Banken unter besonderer Berucksichtigung des Aspektes der Kundenbindung Arndt Brockmann

Paperback

16 634 Ft

Briefwechsel zwischen Wilhelm Dilthey und dem Grafen Paul Yorck von Wartenburg 1877 - 1897 Erich Rothacker

Paperback

12 664 Ft

Physikalische Therapie Josef Kowarschik

Paperback

27 861 Ft

Jochen Klepper Ralph Ludwig

Hardback

5 306 Ft

Sie Ist Schwarz Marcus Schulz

Paperback

4 543 Ft

Les Joyeuses Commères de Windsor W.

Hardback

11 005 Ft

Kinder- Und Jugendkriminalit t René Bendit

Paperback

22 305 Ft

An important and timely contribution to International Relations and political science, this is the first general analysis of deterrence since the end of the Cold War. Using non-cooperative game theory, the authors develop a new approach to deterrence (Perfect Deterrence Theory), which they apply to unilateral and mutual direct-deterrence relationships, and to extended-deterrence relationships supported by deployment policies such as Massive Retaliation and Flexible Response. The authors focus on the relationship among capabilities, preferences, credibility, and outcomes to achieve a new understanding of threats and responses. Some surprising conclusions emerge, indicating that credible threats to respond to attack can sometimes make an attack more likely, and that incredible response threats can sometimes promote peace. With the application of deterrence theory in diverse social settings, and historical examples from before, during, and after the Cold War, this book provides a welcome new examination of the subject.