Free shipping on orders over 19,990 Ft via Packeta, Fox Post Box, and DPD Collection Point

Check order status

Become part of a community of book lovers from all over the world and get access to a whole bunch of benefits. Create an account for free

Free delivery for purchases over 19 990 Ft

DPD courier 1 190 Ft Hungarian Post 1 795 Ft Hungarian Post 1 690 Ft Hungarian Post 1 690 Ft FoxPost 1 190 Ft Packeta point 1 190 Ft DPD point 990 Ft GLS courier 1 690 Ft GLS point 1 190 Ft

Contact

How to shop

Help

My account

▸ Empty :-(

Free shipping on orders over 19,990 Ft via Packeta, Fox Post Box, and DPD Collection Point

Election Timing

Name: Election Timing
Brand: Cambridge University Press
SKU: 02022031
Price: 18104 HUF
Availability: InStock
Author: Alastair Smith
ISBN: 9780521108317

Alastair Smith

Language

English

Book Paperback

Libristo code: 02022031

Publishers Cambridge University Press, April 2009

Endogenous election timing allows leaders to schedule elections 'when the time is right'. The author... Full description

Libristo code: 02022031

125 b

18 104 Ft

In stock at our supplier Shipping in 9-15 days

Up to 30 days for returns

Customers also purchased

Histoire de la Revolution Francaise Louis Blanc

Paperback

22 680 Ft

Estrategias de mediacion aprendizaje para el desarrollo cognoscitivo Alvarez Rodriguez Carmen Every

Paperback

18 770 Ft

Allgemeine Zoologie Hans-Ulrich Koecke

Paperback

27 530 Ft

Dictionnaire Chinois traditionnel - simplifié avec Pinyin- Jianhuazi fantizi duizhao zidian (CH)

Hardback

4 202 Ft

A Lesson Before Dying Ernest J. Gaines

Paperback

4 389 Ft

Freundebuch Meine Kindergarten-Freunde - Mit Wimmelspaß Outi Kaden

Hardback

3 361 Ft

Zápisník s gumičkou 95x140 mm lilie A

Diary

1 621 Ft

Endogenous election timing allows leaders to schedule elections 'when the time is right'. The author proposes and tests an informational theory of endogenous election timing that explains when leaders call for elections and the consequences of their decisions. In particular, he argues that, if all else is equal, leaders announce elections when they anticipate a decline in their future performance. As a consequence, early elections signal a leader's lack of confidence in future outcomes. The earlier elections occur, relative to expectations, the stronger the signal of demise. Using data on British parliaments since 1945, the author tests hypotheses related to timing of elections, electoral support and subsequent economic performance. Leaders who call elections early (relative to expectations) experience a decline in their popular support relative to pre-announcement levels, experience worse post-electoral performance, and have shorter campaigns.